Author: AnYl4Psd

ARMS TRANSFER CONTROLS IN AFRICA – Lessons for the implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty in Sub Sahara Africa

Introduction

Numerous recent publications have described the uncontrolled spread of SALW in several African countries, as well as measures to combat such proliferation. The wider realm of conventional arms transfer controls in that region is still to be covered –an endeavor that has become all the more relevant since the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) came into force.

This GRIP Analysis presents the main findings of the study “Implementation of the Arms Trade Treaty –Assessment of arms transfer control mechanisms in Sub-Saharan African States”. The study was carried out with the support of the French Ministry of Defence, as one of several French initiatives to help African states implement the commitments required of States Parties to the ATT.

In December 2013, 53 African states signed a joint declaration at the Elysée Summit for Peace and Security in Africa in which they “committed to signing and ratifying the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) as soon as possible and welcomed France’s offer of assistance with regard to its implementation”1.To help ensure that future assistance programs address priority needs, a comprehensive assessment was made of the arms transfer control mechanisms currently in place in ten French-speaking African states: Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad and Togo2. The assessment covered regulations, administrative procedures and organisation, as well as human, technical and financial systems. It revealed the nature and the strengths of these systems –quite considerable in some countries –as well as the wider challenges these states face to responsibly honour their commitments under the ATT. For each of the ten countries studied, data were collected on its

– State of the ATT ratification process;

– National institutions;

– Legislative measures;

– Control regime;

– Mechanisms to prevent and combat diversion;

– Inter-agency cooperation;

– International cooperation and assistance; and

– Border controls

Context

ATT –the challenge of implementation

On 2 April 2013, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), with a view to giving states a legally binding instrument establishing “the highest possible common international standards for regulating or improving the regulation of the international trade in conventional arms”. The ATT aims to make up for the lack of international rules on inter-state transfers of arms such as combat aircraft and warships, tanks and armored vehicles, small arms, ammunition or even missiles. One of its main provisions is to require states to authorize their exports on the basis of a prior evaluation of the risks posed in terms of violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law, or of threats to peace and security. The Treaty also prohibits all transfers in certain situations, particularly when the exporting state is aware that the arms could be used for the purposes of genocide, crimes against humanity or war crimes. The new rules aspire to make states accept more responsibility for their decisions to transfer arms, so as to reduce the consequences of armed violence in the world. The ten States studied

The Treaty came into force on 24 December 2014, 18 months after it was opened for signature. By 13 August 2015, the ATT had 130 state signatories and 72 state parties3. The main challenge for the state parties will no doubt be the actual implementation of the Treaty, which requires considerable financial, human and technical resources, in addition to political will. Transposition into domestic law and implementation of the ATT should be relatively easy in countries that already have developed systems for the control of arms transfers. But it may pose greater challenges in other parts of the world. In Africa possibly more than elsewhere, international assistance would be required to help state parties implement the Treaty. Depending on national context, assistance in different areas could be envisaged, such as to help state parties take legislative action, build or strengthen the capacities of their national arms control authorities, or in stockpile management. Preliminary studies need to look into existing systems and procedures, to identify needs and national priorities.

Arms transfers in Sub-Saharan Africa

On a global scale, Sub-Saharan Africa is a small market for conventional arms. A study published by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) in 2011, estimated the market share of Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) at 1.5% of global trade in arms4. SIPRI recorded only two countries in the sub-region exported significant amounts of major conventional arms (i.e., exceeding USD 250,000) in 2008-2012: South Africa (16th world exporter) and Nigeria (50th). Over the same period, only two states in the sub-region ranked among the 50 largest importers of major conventional arms: South Africa (22nd) and Sudan (50th) and four other African states fell into the 51 to 70 tranches: Nigeria (52nd), Uganda (56th), Equatorial Guinea (64th) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (67th). SIPRI also found that Sub-Saharan arms imports increased by 5% between 2003-2007 and 2008. The three main importers of conventional arms are South Africa (24% of the sub-region’s imports), Uganda (15%) and Sudan (12%). A relatively new concern over maritime security and the need to put arms systems in place to ensure this security would explain at least part of this increase in imports. SIPRI further estimated that 41% of the major conventional arms acquired by Sub-Saharan African countries were supplied by other states on the same continent. Arms trade values only reveal part of the picture. African countries acquire few major conventional arms and often of a lower quality and modernity. At the same time, there is a bigger proportion of SALW and ammunitions in their arsenals, although figures are hardly documented in open sources. Moreover, there is little transparency in the arms trade of these countries and their main suppliers. And finally, however modest the volume and the value of these acquisitions, they could still significantly alter the balance of power in a region where relatively few arms are around and that is prone to political and security crises and conflicts. Can African regional conventions on SALW control help implement the ATT? Aware of the devastating impact of the uncontrolled spread of SALW, Sub-Saharan African states began regulating SALW at the end of the 1990s. Four regional agreements on SALW control were drafted relatively independently from one another5. These initiatives bear witness to a perception that is widely shared among local authorities, international institutions and civil society organisations: as SALW are the arms that cause most damage in Africa, restricting their proliferation is mandatory to improve security on the continent. Expected impact on the implementation of the ATT, The African regional instruments to control SALW contain several provisions that are remarkably robust and some of them are used as a model internationally. The African instruments differ from most international agreements on SALW control, in that their scope systematically includes ammunition. The instruments recommend that state parties set up a licensing system for the transfers of SALW they authorise, suggest criteria against which the authorized transfers need to be assessed, and prohibit all transfers to non-state actors and to states subject to an embargo. The instruments additionally recommend state parties adopt provisions on brokering activities, establish monitoring and implementation structures, and use specific documents, such as End User Certificates (EUCs) while also underlining the importance of verifying and authenticating such certificates. States parties to these regional instruments are required to install a single competent authority and an authorisation/licence system for SALW imports, exports and transits over their territory. They must introduce marking, registration and reporting requirements, and cooperate with other states. African states’ existing provisions to combat the proliferation of SALW can offer a basis that can be extended to cover the wider range of conventional arms transfer control.

National systems for the control of transfers –main conclusions and recommendations

Position in the arms trade

Spokesperson for the governments that informed the baseline studies underlined that their respective countries had only a minor place in the international arms trade. Most of them explained that their state was primarily acquiring equipment for its own defence and security needs, and that it rarely or never carried out transit or export operations. A slightly different picture can be gleaned from open source data. There is no doubt these countries are primarily importers, nor that their imports remain modest, but these have been on the rise in recent years. Several African countries responded to new security challenges caused by terrorism and maritime piracy by importing arms in larger quantities. Arms transfer data from open sources also show some states do export arms, re-export what they imported at a later stage, and engage in transit operations. Even if quantities and amounts of these transactions are limited and relate primarily to SALW, the perception that no arms exports occur on the African continent might need to be reviewed. Transfer control systems All analyzed countries were confirmed to dispose of arms transfer control systems. These are based on practices that have been established over time rather than proceed from a comprehensive formal legal framework. Generally speaking, the relevant legislation is inadequate or non-existent. Nevertheless, transfer control systems exist and operate—if imperfectly—, on the basis of practices that have developed over time. The chain of decision-making tends to be well established, even if it is restricted, opaque and informal. The acquisition processes generally lack transparency. The governments of the countries in the study are seen to observe a considerable level of discretion, or even total confidentiality, about their military equipment acquisitions. Inadequate laws The baseline studies confirmed the findings of a 2010 GRIP analysis of arms transfer control laws in French-speaking Sub-Saharan Africa6. Most of these laws are obsolete and their scope of application is poorly defined or too limited. The legal provisions tend to regulate civilian ownership of firearms rather than military acquisitions. In at least one of the countries studied, transfers to the armed and security forces go entirely unregulated. Some of the countries that do have explicit arms transfer provisions, restrict their scope to imports –no legal framework is defined for transits and exports. Information is difficult

National systems for the control of transfers –main conclusions and recommendations Position in the arms trade

Spokesperson for the governments that informed the baseline studies underlined that their respective countries had only a minor place in the international arms trade. Most of them explained that their state was primarily acquiring equipment for its own defence and security needs, and that it rarely or never carried out transit or export operations. A slightly different picture can be gleaned from open source data. There is no doubt these countries are primarily importers, nor that their imports remain modest, but these have been on the rise in recent years. Several African countries responded to new security challenges caused by terrorism and maritime piracy by importing arms in larger quantities. Arms transfer data from open sources also show some states do export arms, re-export what they imported at a later stage, and engage in transit operations. Even if quantities and amounts of these transactions are limited and relate primarily to SALW, the perception that no arms exports occur on the African continent might need to be reviewed.

Transfer control systems

All analysed countries were confirmed to dispose of arms transfer control systems. These are based on practices that have been established over time rather than proceed from a comprehensive formal legal framework. Generally speaking, the relevant legislation is inadequate or non-existent. Nevertheless, transfer control systems exist and operate—if imperfectly—, on the basis of practices that have developed over time. The chain of decision-making tends to be well established, even if it is restricted, opaque and informal. The acquisition processes generally lack transparency. The governments of the countries in the study are seen to observe a considerable level of discretion, or even total confidentiality, about their military equipment acquisitions. Inadequate laws The baseline studies confirmed the findings of a 2010 GRIP analysis of arms transfer control laws in French-speaking Sub-Saharan Africa6. Most of these laws are obsolete and their scope of application is poorly defined or too limited. The legal provisions tend to regulate civilian ownership of firearms rather than military acquisitions. In at least one of the countries studied, transfers to the armed and security forces go entirely unregulated. Some of the countries that do have explicit arms transfer provisions, restrict their scope to imports –no legal framework is defined for transits and exports. Information is difficult to obtain on the administrative procedures in the decision-making processes, and on which authorities are involved in that process.A number of states that have beenparties to regional conventions on SALW for years, are still to transpose those conventions’ transfer control provisions into their national legislation. Some states (mainly ECOWAS members) nevertheless claim they already apply the provisions of the regional convention in the absence of a national law. This highlights one of the most significant conclusions of this study: the absence or inadequacy of legal frameworks does not stop the countries studied from having transfer control systems in place. Some of these countries are actually seen to have developed relatively robust practices over time.

National institutions With the notable exception of the Haute autorité de contrôle des importations des armes et de leur utilization (High Authority for the control of arms imports and their use) in Burkina Faso, none of the countries studied has set up an agency with exclusive responsibility for controlling arms transfers. Decisions to authorise transfers are generally made at the level of the Presidency and the competent ministry -the Defence ministry for transfers to the armed forces, and the Ministry of the Interior or Internal Security for supplies to other security forces and civilians. In some state, the decision-making process is restricted to a limited number of people. In others, it involves an agency in charge of defence and security matters, with members from the ministries and agencies competent in these fields, and always under the authority of the President, such as the Conseil national de sécurité(National Security Council) in Côte d’Ivoire. Control systems and decision-making processes Burkina Faso is the only country in the study where transfer control mechanisms are based on regulations and decrees rather than on practices developed over time. In most of the countries, there is no indication of a systematic assessment of the risks posed by transfers (whether imports, transits or exports), nor that consistent use is made of documents such as licences, import permits or end-user certificates (EUCs). Several countries (particularly Burkina Faso, Gabon and Mauritania) indicated their transfer control practices were shaped by the requirements of the arms supplier countries (mainly with respect to the use of EUCs).Detailed information on the use of licences and EUCs, and on record keeping practices was difficult to obtain given the opacity and rudimentary nature of the transfer control systems in place in most countries. These areas would require further investigation. The decision making process is seen to lack transparency. Little information on arms transfer decisions seems to circulate beyond the individuals and agencies involved in the decision-making process. Considerable reluctance was noted to debate the subject in other institutions, or Parliament or among the general public. Arms transfers are consequently rarely reported on a national level, and even less at an international level. Parliamentary or other independent oversight over the Ministry of Defence or other actors responsible for arms transfers tends to be weak or absent.

Adoption of the ATT and increasing actors’ awareness of the Treaty

Six of the ten countries in the study have ratified the ATT by August 2015, and three others have signed it. During the negotiations of the Treaty, Sub-Saharan African countries had already made it clear that they would support an instrument that was both constraining and robust. This study clearly shows that, in practical terms, this support has varied from one country to another. In several countries studied, the lack of inter-agency communication has at times created a hiatus between the positions defended by the representatives of the Foreign Ministry in New York and the perception of the government representatives present in the capital. Awareness and ownership of the ATT are higher in countries where there had been a debate about armed violence and the proliferation of SALW in the years prior to the adoption of the Treaty, such as in Côte d’Ivoire. These countries seem to make most progress in adopting the ATT. Even if the scope of the Treaty covers all conventional arms transfers, government representatives that informed the study indicated that the transfers of SALW and ammunitions had remained their key concern.

Assistance programmes

The number and scope of assistance programmes differs widely. The availability of that assistance appears contingent on the security situation in the country. More assistance is available to countries embroiled in conflict or recovering from a crisis (such as the DRC, Mali, and Côte d’Ivoire), and less assistance is available to those that are relatively stable (such as Gabon, Togo and Cameroon). The international community show little interest to assist those countries, even when their governments are keen to work on arms control.The assistance programmes from which some countries in the region have benefitted in the past essentially sought to help them implement the United Nations Programme of Action on SALW. This allowed them to work on stockpile management, marking and record keeping, DDR programmes and strengthen institutional and legislative capacities. Intergovernmental cooperation bodies supporting such action include the UA, ECOWAS, RECSA, the SADC or ECCAS, or United Nations agencies (UNREC, UNDP, UNODC). The EU supports similar programmes, as do the governments of, amongst others, Germany, France, Japan and the United States. Even if many initiatives were able to boost states’ capacity to prevent illicit trafficking of SALW and diversion of authorised transfers, transfer controls are the area where assistance programmes had least impact. The government of Burkina Faso, for example, succeeded in strengthening the relevant institutions and administrative procedures under the aegis of the government and outside the strict framework of the assistance programme.

Assistance programmes were key for establishing an institutional architecture. They allowed a debate to take place about the proliferation of SALW and armed violence. Such debate helped increase awareness among governmental actors of the ATT, its objectives and its implementation requirements. Significantly, the ATT seems to appeal less in countries with little or no prior involvement in SALW-control programmes. This situation does little to prevent a limited number of people or agencies (continue) to control and shield from public scrutiny all information onthe country’s arms transfers. In the absence of public debate, it is unclear on what basis needs are formulated and priorities are set. The assistance programmes were both regional and national. There was generally less ownership in the case of regional initiatives, when national context (from an institutional or security point of view, etc.) were insufficiently taken into account. Even where assistance programmes were pursued at national level, the level of ownership by local partners seems to be greaterwhen the programmes have been launched in response to government requests with a respect for its priorities.Finally, a number of assistance programmes were rushed in place in response to security crises, sometimes overlapping control systems that other programmes and donors had helped establish in earlier times. Such assistance is in some cases seen to be redundant or even counterproductive. Some assistance programmes were also seen to be deficient or limited, they were not followed-up or appeared to have misidentified key beneficiaries.

Recommendations

The baseline studies revealed a number of common trends. Some apply to all countries, some to most of them. This allowed to present a series of recommendations and some elements which should be taken into consideration for future ATT implementation assistance programmes.

Understanding the context and the country’s place in the international arms trade

The institutional and political context and security challenges differ significantly from one country to another. These elements have an impact on the volume and type of arms transfers carried out by each government. Even if all countries in the study occupy a modest portion of the world’s arms trade, and are predominantly importers of arms, there are notable differences between them. Several of the countries do export arms as well as import. Some acquire arms mainly through gifts from other governments. A few of the countries in the study are currently under embargoes that restrict the arms they can import. The lifting of such embargoes is anticipated to make them more active on the arms market. Understanding these different dynamics is key to the success of efforts to help implement the ATT. The perception of local partners in this field and the way in which they approach transfer controls must be taken into account as well. Most of these countries are primarily importers. Their transfer controls first and foremost are geared at controlling the government’s arms acquisitions. This may also explain the reluctance that some governments may have vis-à-vis assistance programmes within the framework of the ATT. Furthermore, even if all those countries import major conventional arms, SALW and related ammunition remain central to the concerns of all the national and regional African actors, including with respect to transfer controls. In this regard, the issue of controlling imports of SALW for the benefit of private security companies and of explosives for private companies involved in mining operations is a significant challenge for several countries on the continent of Africa.

Identifying needs and priorities

In addition to understanding local arms transfer dynamics, it is mandatory to identify as many actors and agencies as possible that are directly or indirectly involved in a country’s control systems. All should be considered as stakeholders, who need to be heard in the identification of a country’s needs and priorities. The baseline studies benefitted significantly from extensive field missions conducted in four of the countries. The insight gained through these missions was obviously deeper and more detailed than what desk studies revealed on the other six countries. Similar fieldwork would be needed for a complete appraisal of the realities on the ground, identification of relevant actors and of their needs.

Commitment and political will

In Africa, as elsewhere, controlling the arms that enter and leave the territory is a matter of national sovereignty and security. A fear to lose that control, and or a limited understanding of what the ATT implies, may cause states to refrain from seeking the international assistance that the Treaty mechanism provides. This possibility is relevant to bear in mind, as cooperation and assistance initiatives are unlikely to bear fruit if highest authorities of the beneficiary state are uninterested and uncommitted. This caution may apply even more to the implementation of the ATT than that of the Programme of Action on SALW.

Awareness raising and sharing of expertise

Sustained support to dialogue and similar awareness raising activities can give states clarity on what to expect and not expect the ATT to do, but is notoriously hard to come by as sponsors’ interests may expire in the absence of tangible short-term results. Nevertheless, the baseline studies showed an increased expertise and awareness of the ATT in countries that had previously benefitted from international assistance on SALW control. Initiatives to increase awareness may be accompanied by programmes to exchange expertise on transfer control issues. Such discussions may be much more productive and useful for participants than standard awareness-raising exercises if they can start a dialogue with representatives of other African governments or countries that have recently set up transfer control structures (for example in the context of South-South exchanges).

Strengthen legislation as the starting point for a general debate on the ATT

The great majority of states have established systems that allow them to control the inflow of arms on their territory.In some countries in the study, the systems that are in place have scant or no formal legal ground. Legal frameworks were found to be incomplete, or otherwise unfit for purpose. To shield the systems in place from being overturned in the event of political changes, it would be advisable to codify existing practices. That effort would also mean the legal provisions could be strengthened and extended so as to cover all types of arms that flow in, through, or out of the country. An opportunity could open up in that legislative process to instigate public debate on existing arms control practices and on how to improve them. The provisions of the ATT can guide them in that process. Once established, the legal framework can be refined by in-depth discussion on technical aspects of arms control, such as administrative procedures, end-user certificates and record-keeping.

Strengthen the arms control systems in place with guidance of the ATT

The main objective of the assistance programmes should not be to set up an agency dedicated to transfer controls nor to revise the law, but rather to take serious action to ensure that the government is capable of controlling transfers of arms entering and leaving the country on a sustainable basis and that it is able to prevent and combat such diversions.

Discussions with local partners have clearly shown that their priorities exceed the strict framework of the ATT. This explains that subjects such as marking, stockpile management and border controls have been almost systematically identified as priority needs. These are in fact action areas which, while they are not directly concerned with transfer controls, can have a direct impact on efforts to prevent and combat the diversion of arms acquired legally by these states. Finally, from a pragmatic point of view, setting up initiatives in these areas is also a way to continue working on SALW, a subject of which most African states are aware and which, at first glance, is less likely to encounter reluctance or controversy on the part of national partners.

APPLY FOR THE AWARD New Deal for Nature and People Actor of the Year By 16 September 2022

APPLY
  • Context

Global warming is deeply unfair: poor people in low-income communities are already suffering the most from global warming. Last years, tens of millions of people were forced from their homes by climate change, resulting in more refugees than conflict and violence combined. We can stop this; we can stabilize the climate and in doing so create jobs and opportunities for all in a new green economy.

Failure to tackle nature’s decline will increase nature-related risk (desertification, pollution, erosion, overexploitation of natural resources such as forest and water), hamper prosperity and economic development, further disrupt supply chains, threaten global food security, and cost the global economy at least $479 billion a year – amounting to $10 trillion by 2050.  Addressing the aforementioned challenges requires the involvement of all the layers of the society including young people and women.

Several young people, women and men are engaged to stop and reverse the catastrophic loss of biodiversity, ensure good governance, human rights, peacebuilding and put nature on the path recovery for present and future generations. In order to contribute to their recognition and give them more platforms of visibility, African network of Young Leaders for Peace and Sustainable Development launches the New Deal for Nature and People Actor of the Year 2022.  Their story must be known and heard by the world in order to inspire the next generation.

We do encourage all those that are working in sustainable development goals areas in general and particularly in topics such as (1) Climate, biodiversity Communication, (2) Artists, Film-Makers and Climate Change; (3) Religion, biodiversity and Climate Change; (3) Green Jobs and Green Tech; (3) Fuel, gas, mineral exploitation; (4) Reduce, Re-Use, Recycle for nature and climate; (5) Reducing Waste & cleaning up; (6) ecosystem restoration; (7) Afforestation, mangrove and forest protection; (8) Renewable and sustainable Energy; (9) Tourism for nature and climate; (10) Energy, Oil and gas for nature: Championing/advocating for renewable and clean energy,  green strings; (11) Aquaculture; (12) Nature and regenerative based Solutions; (13) Biodiversity and Forest Conservation; (14) Ecosystems based adaptation for Food Security; (15) Climate Smart Agriculture and regenerative Agriculture; (16) protection and management of coastal and water-based ecosystems, such as mangroves and seagrass; (17) Water, hygiene, sanitation and health; (18) Nature-based Solutions to restore, regenerate and sustain watersheds; (19) Ocean, wetland restoration and water provisioning; (20) Environment and infrastructure; (21) Loss and damage; (22) Digital and artificial intelligence for nature and climate; (22) environmental and sustainability law; (23) Peace, climate and migration; (24) Children, peacebuilding and ecosystem safegard; (25) Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and; (24) Other sustainable Development goals sectors.

  • Cathegories of the Award

The New Deal for Nature and People Actor of the year is an award that is granted to one person in each of the below categories, for his/her commitment and tireless work for nature, for climate and sustainable development goals.  The Award is made up of 4 categories:

  • Civil society (activist, member of an organization or a group, Expert…)
  • Research (Researcher, scientific works, scientific articles….)
  • Green Entrepreneurship (Nature Based solutions, Startup, business…)
  • Local elected (Mayors, parliamentarians…)
  • Selection Criteria

The award honours actors who made a substantial contribution to the pursuit of peace and sustainable development in his /her community, region or continent. The annual award recipient is chosen with the help of the New Deal for Nature and People Award committee made up of experts from civil society, researchers, government officials. The Committee’s core role is to help select the finalists and the awardee of the New Deal for Nature and People Actor of the Year.

Nominees should demonstrate the following four qualities:

  • Commitment: An actor who works to prevent or resolve pressing issues at local, national or international level.
  • Exceptional Leadership: An actor with a vision, who embodies innovation in his/her actions and has earned the respect of community.
  • Outstanding Practitioner: An actor who mobilises stakeholders for nature, climate and people at local, national or international level.
  • Substantial Impact: An actor whose work has led to tangible results. 

Requirements

Every nominee must meet all of the five requirements listed below in order to move forward in the nomination application process.

  • Anyone can nominate him/herself or another person for this award.
  • The nominee must be an activist of at least 18 years of age.
  • The nominee is called to duly fill out the google form, by providing as much as possible proofs and attaching his/her document “My Commitment for Nature, Climate and People”  
  • The nominee should not be employed by ANYL4PSD or a recipient of previous ND4NP Awards.

Each candidate is invited to prepare a document titled “My Commitment for Nature, Climate and People” containing the answers to the following questions.

(a) What is your name and your country of origin?  (b) What is/are the problem(s) you have adressed? How did the issue(s) affect(ed) human rights, your community and the environment? Why did you commit to solving/adressing this/these problem(s)? (c) What goal(s) did you set to help solve/adress this/these problem(s)? (d) Who were the target(s) and the beneficiaries of your Actions? (e) What are the specific actions you have carried out to solve/adress this/these problem(s) ? (f) What results and positive changes have you achieved so far through your actions (please insert figures if possible)? (g) Can you talk about the difficulties you have encountered during the implementation of your actions? (h) What solutions have you developed to overcome each of the difficulties you have encountered? (i) Which actors helped you to solve these difficulties and how? (J) Which lessons have you learned from the implementation of your Actions? (k) Which actions do you wish to undertake in the future? (k) Which recommendations can you formulate towards local, national, regional and international stakeholders regarding this/these problem(s) you have been committed to solve? (l) Can you insert photos and/or useful links related to your actions to support your candidacy? (m) Kindly provide your full name, your country of residence, your phone number with country code and your email.  

You will attach the document “My Commitment for Nature, Climate and People” when filling out in the google form (at the required section).

To participate, kindly fill out this Google form: https://forms.gle/RrdXZzAREorYDjLHA

Dateline for submission: 16 September 2022

Results will be disclosed by November 2022  

We will be grateful if you can spread the word in your various networks, platforms and social media.  Should you have any question, do not hesitate to contact us in-box at the WhatsApp number +237 657991622.

  • Frequently Asked Question FAQs

What is the New Deal for Nature and People?

In the UN Decade for Ecosystem restoration the New Deal for Nature and People is a global movement that seeks to protect and restore nature for the benefit of people and planet – proposing no more loss of natural spaces or extinctions as well as halving the negative ecological impacts of production and consumption. It champions strengthened commitments and delivery mechanisms for the UN Biodiversity Convention alongside a strengthened private-sector commitment to action – and efforts to deliver current UN agreements on tackling climate change and encouraging sustainable development – the fate of the climate, human development and nature are linked together.

What are the benefits tied to the Award?

  • An online promotion of the winners will be made;
  • The Winners will be showcased in a Special Edition of the New deal for Nature and People Magazine
  • ANYL4PSD and partners will grant to the Winners opportunities to showcase their works in various platforms
  • The Winners will be invited to speak as special guests in several events.

Who can submit nominations?

Both men and women can act as nominators. Nominators should be familiar with the nominee’s work and be able to speak specifically to ways in which the nominee meets the selection criteria. Self-nomination is accepted.

Can I nominate more than one person?

No. Nominators may not nominate more than one person.

Does the activist I am nominating need to know I have nominated him/her?

Yes. Nomination applications should be completed in consultation with the nominee. Nominators

Can more than one person nominate the same individual?

No. Only one nomination application will be accepted for each activist. If more than one nomination is received for a nominee, the first nomination submitted will be considered for the award.

Can I nominate myself for the award?

Yes. Self-nominations are accepted.

What happens to a nomination application if the nominee does not meet the Eligibility Requirements for the award?

All nomination applications are reviewed to ensure that the nominee meets the Eligibility Requirements. If a nominee does not meet the Eligibility Requirements, the nomination application will not be accepted.

If the nominee is not chosen as a Finalist for the ND4NP Award, is He/she eligible to apply for another ANYL4PSD grant or fellowship opportunity?

Yes. A nominee may apply for ANYL4PSD grant or fellowship opportunity.

Who do I contact if I have additional questions about the award?

Kindly contact us via the WhatsApp number +237657991622

APPLY

Overview of Serious and Organised crime in West Africa

Transnational organized crime in West Africa is a persistent threat. As a result, INTERPOL, under the European Union funded ENACT Project, has sought to catalogue and assess organized crime in the region in order to drive a more strategic law enforcement response.

International criminal organizations continue to target the region especially because of the significant illicit wealth that can be generated, stemming from criminal market opportunities that exploit various social and political vulnerabilities, state fragility, limited policing capacities, and corruption.
International criminal organizations or networks operate everywhere in the region via key facilitators and bring together a significant array of crime syndicates that provide illicit goods and services everywhere.

Crime syndicates remain highly connected across borders and are active in a number of illicit markets, notably drug trafficking, financial crimes, human trafficking, people smuggling, counterfeit goods, organized theft and robbery, environmental crimes, and maritime piracy. In addition, there are a number of enabling crimes such as cybercrime, and the trade in small arms and light weapons that are supporting organized criminality throughout the region, which overlap with all illicit markets noted in complex ways.

Organized crime in the region generates huge profits for all involved and there are substantial illicit interregional financial flows and illicit profits heading offshore, plus money laundering occurring on a global scale. The threat from organized crime in West Africa is substantial yet there is limited capacity amongst law enforcement to manage this complex issue. Organized crime is going underreported and undetected, but various data sources reveal the following major activities and dynamics of groups and networks active in the region, which need to be addressed strategically and through building greater partnerships amongst all law enforcement agencies in the region.

Download the PDF Document to read the full report.
Overview-of-Serious-and-Organised-crime-in-West-Africa_ANYL4PSDDownload

Overview of Organized crime in Africa

International criminal organizations continue to target Africa because of the significant illicit wealth that can be generated, stemming from criminal market opportunities that exploit various social and political vulnerabilities, state fragility, and limited policing capacities present on the continent. International criminal organizations or networks operate everywhere in Africa via key facilitators and bring together a significant array of crime syndicates and street gangs that provide illicit goods and services.


Crime syndicates remain highly connected across borders and are active in a number of illicit markets, notably drug trafficking, human trafficking and people smuggling, environmental crimes, financial crimes, counterfeited goods, works of art trafficking, stolen motor vehicles trafficking and maritime piracy. In addition, there are enabling crimes such as cybercrime, and the trade in small arms and light weapons that are supporting organized criminality throughout the continent which overlap with all of the illicit markets noted in complex ways. Organized crime in Africa generates huge profits for all involved, and there are substantial illicit interregional financial flows and illicit profits moving throughout the continent and often heading offshore. Money laundering relating to all criminal market activities is occurring on a global scale.


The threat from organized crime in Africa is substantial, yet there is limited capacity amongst law enforcement to manage this complex issue at a national, regional and continental level. Organized crime is going under-reported and undetected, but various data sources reveal the following major activities and dynamics of groups and networks, which need to be addressed strategically, through building greater partnerships amongst all law enforcement agencies everywhere on the continent.

Download the PDF Document to read the full report.
Overview-of-Organised-crime-in-Africa_ANYL4PSDDownload

Impact of Climate Change on Major Staple Food Crops and Farmers’ Adaptation Strategies in Atacora.

  1. INTRODUCTION

Agriculture is the biggest single industry in many developing countries of the world. Benin is a West African country in which agriculture plays an important economic role. The agricultural sector employs about 70% of the population and contributes to 39% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (Awoye, 2015) of Benin. It also provides about 88% of the country’s export earnings (Awoye, 2015). The lack of modern farming technologies, poor soil, land degradation, and the rapid population growth constitute the challenges that Benin agriculture is facing. In Benin, the farmers rely highly on the rain-fed agriculture for crop productions. The high dependence on rain-fed agriculture combined with low socioeconomic development expose subsistence agriculture farmers to external shocks such as climate variability and climate change impacts. Empirical evidence reveals that the increasing of global temperature is likely to boost agricultural production in the temperate region, and it is expected to reduce yields in the tropical regions of the world (WTO –UNEP, 2009). Studies conducted by Afouda (1990), Houndénou (1999), Ogouwalé (2006)and Boko (1988) cited by Tidjani (2012) , revealed that there is increasing of minimum temperature and agricultural season length is shortening in Benin. Some regional climate models predict a decrease of annual rainfall up to 30% by 2050 in Benin with a significant within- region differences (Paeth et al., 2008). This change will decrease yield production already challenged by limited access to capital, markets, infrastructure and technology. Benin has already experienced food insecurity and climate change will exacerbate it through the increase in frequency of adverse weather events. The Northwest part of Benin (Atacora) is characterized by a unimodal rainfall regime (peak in August). This means the district is more heavily exposed to the impact of climate change. A well-known study in this respect is the one carried out on farmers’ perception and impact of climate change on production and yam varietal diversity in Northwest of Benin (Loko et al., 2013). Fewresearch works have been conducted in that on the impacts of climate change on the major staple food crops and farmers’ adaptation strategies to this change in the district. This present study examines the impact of climate change on major staple food crops (yam, maize, sorghum, and rice and bean productions) and farmers’ adaptation strategies to this change in Atacora. The section 2 explaines the methodogy used to achieve the goal of this study. The section 3 shows the results of the analysis.

  1. MATERIALS and METHODS

The study area is the Atacora, located in northwest Benin, it counts nine communes, which are: Natitingou, Kérou, Kouandé, Péhunco, Cobly, Boukoumbé, Matéri, Toucountouna, and Tanguiéta. It shares borders with the Republic of Burkina-Faso in the North, a Donga district in the South, Alibori and Borgou district in the East and Republic of Togo to the West (Figure 1). This district is characterized by a unimodalrainfall distribution (peak in August). The rainfall is unpredictable and irregular with an average between 800 and 950 mm per year (Dansi, Adoukonou-sagbadja, &Vodouhe, 2010). The wet season starts from late mid-June to late October while April-May is the dry season. The landscape in this region is composed of Rocky Mountains, with tropical ferruginous soils and wetland (Dansi et al., 2010). The territory of Atacora consists of 772,262 inhabitants unequally distributed in 384 villages (RGPH-4, 2013). The mean population density is 38 inhabitants/km2 (RGPH-4, 2013). The district is inhabited by seven ethnic groups Bariba, Berba, Ditamari, Lamba, Natimba, Wama and Bialli (Dansi and al., 2010). The main livelihood of the population is farming.

For this study, five communes (Boukoumbe, Cobly, Kérou, Matéri, and Toucontouna) have been selected based on the ethnolinguistic map of Benin and the agricultural potential of each commune. Two villages were chosen per commune. An exploratory survey was conducted to identify the two villages retained for this study. Within each village the interviews were conducted to identify the major staple food crops grown and communities’ adaptive measures developed to cope with the adverse impacts of climate change in the five communes. The temperature (°C), and rainfall (mm) data from 1986 to 2016 was obtained from the National Meteorological Service of Benin while data on major staple food crops for 1986 to 2016 was collected from CARDER (Centre d’Action Régional de Dévelopement Rural) and INSAE (Institut National de Statistique et de l’Analyse Economique). The total annual crop productions of five communes for each major staple food crops grown were obtained by calculating the sum of each crop production of five communes. The rainfall and temperature anomalies were calculated for all the years from the use of the long-term mean, yearly mean and the standard deviation using equation below:

φ = x- x ̅ / σ

Where φrepresents the anomaly value of rainfall and temperature, x is the actual value of each parameter (temperature and rainfall), x ̅ is the long term mean value of each parameter (temperature and rainfall), σ is the standard deviation.

For each major staple food crops the multiple linear regressions model were realized to see their associations with temperature and rainfall. A statistical test was performed using the Software R software. Also, the Excel spreadsheet was used to design the figures.

The model is specified asWhere, Y represents yam, maize, bean, sorghum and rice outputs at time I, x Temperature 1, x Rainfalls 1,μ Stochastic term β β and β = constants

Figure 1. Map of Atacora District

  1. RESULTS

3.1. Climatic condition in Atacora

Observed rainfall and temperature trends

Figure 2.Standardized anomalies of rainfall and temperature in Atacora

The analysis of figure 2 shows the variations trends of temperature and rainfall distribution in Atacora from 1986-2016. Between 1986 to 1997, the temperature trend have been fluctuating and decreasing with values ranging from -1.85 to -0.35°C while a positive trend of temperature was observed from 1998 to 2016. For the precipitation, the positive trend was recorded over the period 1986 to 2004 and the reverse in trend was observed 2004 to 2016.

3.2. Farmers’ strategies for adaptation to climate change in ATACORA

Farmers have adopted different strategies to adapt to climate change and climate variability. Farming is the main occupation for the majority of the sample households. Based on the household survey data collected from 422 households, the farmers reported that they are using different adaptation strategies to reduce the negative impact of climate change. Thirteen (3.08%) farmers use agroforestry (nere’, Shea, tree species), sixty-five farmers shift their cropping calendars (15.4%), fifty-nine farmers (13.98%) exploit the shallows for their crop production, fifty-five farmers use mixed cropping(13.03%), seventy-five farmers apply chemical fertilizers and pesticides (17.78%), hundred-five farmers adopt short season crop with high yield (24.89%), thirty-eight farmers use agricultural expansion (9%), and twelve farmers (2.84%) breed animals to compensate crop failure due to climate variability (Figure 3). The strategy used by each farmers, has a specific purpose, although the ultimate and common goal is adaptation to climate change. Some farmers who practice agro-forestry (integrate trees and crops) had a deep knowledge of the benefits of such practice: preventing soil erosion, reducing losses of water, availability of organic matter and nutrients, reducing the amount of agricultural insect pests and associated diseases etc. The mixed cropping frequently mentioned by farmers was: maize–sorghum, sorghum-millet, maize–groundnut, maize–bean, maize–millet–sorghum, and maize -cassava. It should also be noted that farmers associate these practices with a concern for preserving food and nutritional security of the household. Farmers are seeking to increase the chances of guaranteeing a minimum of products after harvesting. “If one fails, the other can succeed,” said the respondents. Farmers used short season crop with high yield, and shallows as an adaptation strategy to reduce the adverse effect of climate change. They also used chemical fertilizers to increase crop productivity and pesticides to control pests and diseases. In addition, some farmers have adopted small ruminant and poultry farming to diversify their sources of income.

Figure 3.

Farmers’ strategies for adaptation to climate change

3.3. Agricultural productions in Atacora

Yield of major staple food crops in Atacora

Figure 4 shows the evolution of yield of the main agricultural commodities over the thirty years. The figure shows that yam, rice and maize have dominated the increases in production over time. The yield increases for sorghum and the produced beanhas been slow as compared to the yam, rice and maize production. This has happened as a result of the strategy adaptation adopted by the farmers to cope with the negative impacts of climate variation. As strategy, the farmers reducing crop area of long crop seasons (sorghum) and increasing cultivated land of short season crop with high yield (maize and rice). Bean areas have not increased because of theincreasing pests and diseases for this crop. Yam production has increased mostly as a result of area expansion. Despite the fact that there is no introduction of new breeds of yam-seedlings, the cultivated land of this culture is expanded as the main means to maintain the level of yam production because of the important role that this crop plays in cultural practices. This is a reflection of the lack of support for agricultural production of yam, bean and sorghum, the lack of inputs and services to support the intensification of these crops production systems.

Figure 4.Yield of major staple food crops in Atacora over thirty years

  • Relationship between climate variables and crop yields

Several recent studies (Jarvis et al., 2012; Rosenthal & Ort, 2012; and Liu et al., 2008) indicate that climate change in Africa will have variable impacts on crops, with both production losses and gains possible. The multiple regressions were used to see the associations of climatic variables with crop yields in Atacora. The results revealed that the rainfall has significant effect on the output of maize and sorghum at four percent (4%) and for bean at three percent (3%) with a negative coefficient of -0.78, -0.23 and -0.31(Table 1). This result shows that if the rainfall increases by one unit (1), then maize, sorghum and bean outputs will decrease by 0.23, 0.31, and 0.78 kilograms respectively in the long run. Rice and yam outputs show that the temperature has a significant effect on rice and yam with a positive coefficient of 62.2 and 70.5 respectively implying that if temperature increases by one unit rice and yam outputs will increase by 62.2 and 70.5 kilograms respectively (Table 1).

Table 1.Multiple regression results according to climate variables and crop yields

Dependent variables

Independent variables

Coefficient

Std. Error

t value

Pr(>|t|

Rice

Intercept

-144.1

162.25

-3.26

0.002**

Rainfall

-0.45

1.45

-0.31

0.75ns

Temperature

62.25 

17.5  

3.55

0.001**

 

     

Maize

Intercept

2503.67

5199.51

0.48

0.63ns

 

Rainfall

-0.78

0.37

-2.10

0.04 *

 

Temperature

 -2.38

150.77

-0.01

0.98ns

 

     

Sorghum

Intercept

4072.56

1543.91

2.63

0.01 *

Rainfall

-0.23

0.11

-2.09

0.04 *

Temperature

-88.11

44.76 

-1.96

0.05 ns

 

     

Bean

Intercept

-511.03

2026.53

-0.25

0.80ns

Rainfall

-0.31

0.14

-2.17

0.03*

Temperature

53.08

58.76

0.90

0.37ns

 

     

Yam

Intercept

-118.47

79.44

-1.49

0.14

Temperature

70.56 

31.16  

2.26  

0.03 *

Rainfall

1.49

1.05

0.3860.38

0.70

Note: *= Significant at 5%    ns= non-significant

 

CONCLUSION

The study examines the effects on temperature and rainfall variability on yam, maize, bean, sorghum and rice output in Atacora from 1986 to 2016 and farmers’ adaptation strategies to this change. Results from the study revealed that there is an increase in temperature and decreasing rainfall pattern in the study area. Also, this study discovers that temperature significantly affects outputs of yam and rice while rainfall has significant effect on the output of maize, bean, sorghum over the period under study. In response to climate variation, farmers adjust their cropping calendars by shifting either forward or backward the timing of land preparation and seedling, adopt short season crop with high yield, use the shallows for agricultural productions, use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, reducing land of long crop seasons and increasing cultivated land of short duration high yielding crops. The use of chemical fertilizers release the nitrous oxide into the atmosphere which is the most important contribution of GHGs related to agriculture. As the population continues to grow and progress is made in achieving food and nutrition security for the population, chemical fertilizer use will increase for the foreseeable future. This will increase concentrations of nitrous oxide in the atmosphere and will cause a heavy strain on the environment as well as on the quality of the food produced.The problems of climate change are already with us, therefore the private sectors and Beninese government should focus on improved agricultural productivity by developing technology which will not contribute to changes in climate, but increased production through proper funding and implementation. With the decreasing rainfall amount and increasing of temperature, Beninese government should start to invest on irrigation farming in this locality rather than relying more on rain-fed agriculture that is highly unreliable and becoming more unpredictable. In addition, farmers should be sensitized about the negative effects of the long-term application of chemical fertilizers and pesticides on the environment, human health and soil fertility.

 

 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Awoye, O. H. R. (2015). The implication of Future Climate Change on Agricultural production in Tropical West Africa. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation), Porto-Novo (Benin), 1-189.I

Ayanlade, A. (2010). Impacts of climate variability on tuber crops in Guinea Savanna part of Nigeria: a GIS approach. Journal of Geography and …, 2(1), 27–35. Retrieved from http://www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/jgg/article/download/7274/5762

Dansi, A., Adoukonou-sagbadja, H., &Vodouhe, R. (2010). Diversity, conservation and related wild species of Fonio millet ( Digitaria spp.) in the northwest of Benin. Genet Resour Crop Evol 57:827–839.  https://doi.org/10.1007/s10722-009-9522-3

Ejikeme, O., &Akpabio, E. M. (2017). The geography of yam cultivation in southern Nigeria: exploring its social meanings and cultural functions. Journal of Ethnic Foods, 4 (1), 28‐35 https:doi.org/10.1016/j.jef.2027.02.004

 

Eregha, P. B., Babatolu, J. S., &Akinnubi, R. T. (2014). Climate change and crop production in Nigeria: An error correction modelling approach. International Journal of Energy Economics and Policy, 4(2), 297–311. Retrieved from http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2s2.084897106987&partnerID=40&md5=333625e2e579aba6c9ef15ea1790a8f3

 

Jarvis, A., Ramirez-Villegas, J.,  Campo, B.V.H., & Navarro-Racines, C. (2012). Is cassava the answer to African

climate change adaptation? Tropical Plant Biology, 5(1), pp.9-29.

 

Liu, J. , Fritz, S. ,. vanWesenbeeck, C.F.A, Fuchs, M. , You, L., Obersteiner, M. , & Yang, H. (2008). A spatially explicit assessment of current and future hotspots of hunger in sub-Saharan Africa in the context of global change. Global and Planetary Change, 64(3-4), pp. 222-235.

 

Loko, Y. L., Dansi, A., Agre, A. P., Akpa, N., Assogba, P., Dansi, M., &Sanni, K. A. A. (2013).Perceptions paysannes et impacts des changements climatiques sur la production et la diversité variétale de l ’ igname dans la zone aride du nord-ouest du Bénin, 7(April), 672–695.

 

Mikova, K. (2015). Effect of Climate Change on Crop Production in Rwanda. Earth Sciences, 4(3), 120. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.earth.20150403.15

Paeth, H., Hall, N.M.J., Gaertner, M.A., Dominguez Alonso, M., Moumouni, S., Polcher, J., Ruti, P.M., Fink, A.H., Gosset, M., Lebel, T., Gaye, A.T., Rowell, D.P., Moufouma-Okia, W., Jacob, D., Rockel, B., Giorgi, F., regional downscaling of West African precipitation. Atmospheric Science Letters 12, 75–82.

Pi, A., Bc, A., &Bogbenda, A. (2017). Simulating the effect of climate change on the output of major crops in Benue State Nigeria, 5(4), 594–602.

Regh, T., Bossa, A. Y., &Diekkrüger, B. (2014). Scenario-based simulations of the impacts of rainfall variability and management options on maize production in Benin, 9(46), 3393–3410. https://doi.org/10.5897/AJAR2014.8757

 

Recensement Général de la Population et de L’Habitation (RGPH4). (2013). Effectifs de la Population des Villages et Quartiers de ville du Benin. Republique du Benin, Mai, 2-83.

Rosenthal, D. M., &Ort, D. R. (2012).Examining cassava’s potential to enhance food security under climate change.

Tropical Plant Biology, 5(1), pp. 30-38.

Tidjani, M.A., &Akponikpe,P.B.I. (2012).Evaluation des stratégies paysannes d’adaptation aux changements climatiques : cas de la production du maïs au nord-bénin. African Crop Science Journal, Vol. 20, 425–441.

 

World Trade Organization & the United Nations Environmental (WTO-UNEP) Report (2009), On Trade and Climate Change. Switzerland. World Trade Organization. www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/trade_climate_change_e.pdf

 

Uger, F. I. (2017). Impact of Climate Variability on Yam Production in Benue State: an Empirical Analysis, 4(2), 14–23.

WORLDWIDE CALL FOR APPLICATIONS, 2021 New Deal for Nature and People Research Group Submission

Global trade and economic growth over the last half century have driven huge improvements in health and living standards but also undermined the stability of the Earth’s natural systems and exacerbated global inequality. The 2020 Living Planet Index shows that global populations of mammals, birds, amphibians, reptiles and fish have suffered an average 68% decline in less than half a century (from 1970 to 2016).  According to the World Economic Forum Global Risks Report 2020, the top five most pressing challenges facing Africa and the world over the next decade are, for the first time, all related to the environment, and include biodiversity loss and climate change. Thus, the main cause of this dramatic decline is habitat loss and degradation, including deforestation, driven by how we as humanity produce food.

Our economies are embedded within nature but economics do not recognize that human health, wealth and security depend on safeguarding environmental health. Nature powers industry and enterprise but we are using up ‘natural capital’ and degrading natural systems faster than nature can replenish and restore them, exceeding Earth’s overall bio capacity by 58% according to Ecological Foot printing.

Failure to tackle nature’s decline will increase nature-related risk (desertification, pollution, erosion, overexploitation of natural resources such as forest and water), hamper prosperity and economic development, further disrupt supply chains, threaten global food security, and cost the global economy at least $479 billion a year – amounting to $10 trillion by 2050.  

Addressing the aforementioned challenges requires the involvement of youths and civil society. Thus, as part of its engagement for ecosystems restoration African network of Young Leaders for Peace and Sustainable Development has set the New Deal for Nature and People Coalition made up of over 500 civil society organizations committed towards the nature and human positive Vision: to stop and reverse the catastrophic loss of biodiversity, ensure good governance, human rights, peacebuilding and put nature on the path recovery for present and future generations. In 2020, African youths and civil society organizations members of the coalition drafted two regional position papers on COVID19 and pandemics and towards a strong post 2020 Global Biodiversity Framework for a green growth resumption in Africa and in the world.

Youth and Civil Society have a role to lead the continent and the world to transiting to custodians of natural capital, human rights, peace and development. Among various approaches used thereto, African Network of Young Leaders for Peace and Sustainable Development emphasizes in the production of articles as tools of teaching, learning, experience sharing and advocacy. A Research group of worldwide writers called the New Deal for Nature and People Research Group has been set.

Objectives

The present call aims at recruiting new members of the New Deal for Nature and People Research and Actions Group.  Under the coordination of African Network of Young Leaders for Peace and Sustainable Development, the group seek on one hand, to strengthen the scientific production of civil society actors on issues relating to sustainable development goals at local, national and regional level, and on another hand, to reinforce their visibility through the release of their works on several regional and international platforms and channels. Several collaborative initiatives and work will be implemented with selected members who will be given membership certificate and further details after selection.

Criteria of application

  • Be an individual or a representative of an organization
  • Be a citizen of any country member of the United Nations
  • Show a proof of at least one article or scientific work written in any area related to conservation and restoration of ecosystems, climate change, peacebuilding and sustainable development
  • Propose 2 themes you wish to develop within the New Deal for Nature and People Research Group
Click here TO APPLY
Kindly join our social media community by subscribing to our channels. You may also share them in your various platforms 


You can reach us to: info@anyl4psd.org

WORLDWIDE CALL FOR APPLICATIONS, 2021 New Deal for Nature and People AMBASSADORS

Global trade and economic growth over the last half century have driven huge improvements in health and living standards but also undermined the stability of the Earth’s natural systems and exacerbated global inequality. The 2020 Living Planet Index shows that global populations of mammals, birds, amphibians, reptiles and fish have suffered an average 68% decline in less than half a century (from 1970 to 2016).  According to the World Economic Forum Global Risks Report 2020, the top five most pressing challenges facing Africa and the world over the next decade are, for the first time, all related to the environment, and include biodiversity loss and climate change. Thus, the main cause of this dramatic decline is habitat loss and degradation, including deforestation, driven by how we as humanity produce food.

Our economies are embedded within nature but economics do not recognize that human health, wealth and security depend on safeguarding environmental health. Nature powers industry and enterprise but we are using up ‘natural capital’ and degrading natural systems faster than nature can replenish and restore them, exceeding Earth’s overall bio capacity by 58% according to Ecological Foot printing.

Failure to tackle nature’s decline will increase nature-related risk (desertification, pollution, erosion, overexploitation of natural resources such as forest and water), hamper prosperity and economic development, further disrupt supply chains, threaten global food security, and cost the global economy at least $479 billion a year – amounting to $10 trillion by 2050.  

Addressing the aforementioned challenges requires the involvement of youths and civil society. Thus, as part of its engagement for ecosystems restoration African network of Young Leaders for Peace and Sustainable Development has set the New Deal for Nature and People Coalition made up of over 500 civil society organizations committed towards the nature and human positive Vision: to stop and reverse the catastrophic loss of biodiversity, ensure good governance, human rights, peacebuilding and put nature on the path recovery for present and future generations. In 2020, African youths and civil society organizations members of the coalition drafted two regional position papers on COVID19 and pandemics and towards a strong post 2020 Global Biodiversity Framework for a green growth resumption in Africa and in the world.

Youth and Civil Society have a role to lead the continent and the world to transiting to custodians of natural capital, human rights, peace and development. African Network of Young Leaders for Peace and sustainable Development champions the New Deal for Nature and People and believes that there is a need of ambassadors. The present call aims at recruiting the 2021 Cohort of the New Deal for Nature and People Ambassadors. 

Overview on the New Deal for Nature and People Ambassador

Can become New Deal for Nature and People (ND4NP) Ambassadors, citizens of all countries, engaged to stop and reverse the catastrophic loss of biodiversity, ensure good governance, human rights, peacebuilding and put nature on the path recovery for present and future generations. Ambassador share their experiences, help document community stories, priorities, ideas, worries, needs, and opinions related to climate change and biodiversity.

With the help of Ambassadors, those that are underrepresented, underserved, or made vulnerable, and expected to experience the first and worst consequences of climate change, see their voice heard and are involved in decision making processes concerning their life and future. We understand and value that people know best how to engage with their own communities, and we encourage Ambassadors to engage with their communities in their own way.

We’re not looking for the strongest activists. What we are looking for people who love the humanity and planet and are voluntarily dedicated, even with small actions, to safeguard our planet and champion human rights.

Objective and Approach

The objective of the New Deal for Nature and People Ambassadors is to mentor youth in becoming more active by:

  • Providing information on relevant ecosystems, climate and sustainable development related issues at local, regional and international level;
  • Raising awareness about how ecosystem and climate issues affect human rights, peacebuilding, migration, and others sustainable development goals, how decisions are made and how youth can affect those decisions
  • Providing opportunities for youth to participate in meaningful discussions about the urban environment (through events, online, etc.)
  • Making the New Deal for Nature and People fresh, fun and tailored to youths

Key components of the program include:

  • An online portal for information on ecosystem, climate, and human rights related issues
  • Events that bring together young people (e.g., high school/university/college students, young professionals, etc.) and leaders to discuss ecosystem and human rights related issues
  • A network of youth and youth organizations with similar objectives

What is ND4NP Ambassadors?

  • A New Deal for Nature and People (ND4NP) Ambassador is a young person who has volunteered to act as a representative, contributor and/or and promoter of the New Deal for Nature and People and is committed to helping stop and reverse the catastrophic loss of biodiversity, ensure good governance, human rights, peacebuilding and put nature on the path recovery for present and future generations.
  • New Deal for Nature and People (ND4NP) Ambassadors do not absolutely need any formal training or education in ecosystem, climate and human rights related issues. They can be high school students, college/university students, young professionals, civil society activists, or somewhere in between.

Roles and Responsibilities of ND4NP Ambassadors

There are four possible ND4NP Ambassador roles:

  • Content Makers – Developing blog posts, articles and other research tasks.
  • Experience Makers– Working with African Network of Young Leaders for Peace and Sustainable Development towards the Post 2020 biodiversity framework for ecosystems restoration.
  • Social Makers – Engaging other youth by sharing, posting, tweeting and discussing on thematic related to the New Deal for Nature and People.
  • Media Makers – Making videos, infographics or taking pictures to support New Deal for Nature and People

The ND4NP Ambassadors also have a responsibility to represent the ND4NP brand in their country and be an advocate for the initiative.

Roles and Responsibilities of African Network of Young Leaders for Peace and Sustainable Development (ANYL4PSD)

ANYL4PSD is responsible for overall management and delivery of the New Deal for Nature and People Coalition. Key roles for ANYL4PSD include:

  • Recruit and manage the ND4NP Ambassadors
  • Provide the tools and guidance needed to help Ambassadors complete their assigned tasks.
  • Communicate with ND4NP Ambassadors on a regular basis.
  • Create and manage the website and blog.
  • Develop templates and instructions for creating blog posts and factsheets.
  • Grow/facilitate the ND4NP Ambassadors network through social media and marketing.

What’s in it for you?

  • Each of Ambassador roles provides an opportunity for you to contribute to a meaningful and important youth initiative.
  • A one-year renewable certificate will be delivered to you.
  • Becoming a ND4NP Ambassadors will give you an opportunity to improve and develop new skills in research, writing, event coordination, media creation, etc.
  • ANYL4PSD will be happy to provide a reference or vouch for your contributions. You will also have the opportunity to interact with professionals, other organizations, speakers, etc. along the way.
  • Your actions for Nature and climate, human rights and Peace will be showcased and disseminated in several platforms and Magazine.
  • You’ll get to connect with other youth with similar interests (who may end up being your colleagues one day!). Plus, it’s going to be a lot of fun!

The deadline for submitting applications is August 18, 2021, then we will assess all applicants and announce the names of the new ND4NP ambassadors.

Click here to apply
Kindly join our social media community by subscribing to our channels. You may also share them in your various platforms 


You can reach us to: info@anyl4psd.org

NEW DEAL FOR NATURE AND PEOPLE: BOOKLET OF BEST PRACTICES

The 2020 Living Planet Index shows that global populations of mammals, birds, amphibians, reptiles and fish have suffered an average 68% decline in less than half a century (from 1970 to 2016). The main cause of this dramatic decline is habitat loss and degradation, including deforestation, driven by how we as humanity produce food. Nature powers industry and enterprise but we are using up ‘natural capital’ and degrading natural systems faster than nature can replenish and restore them, exceeding Earth’s overall bio capacity by 58% according to Ecological Foot printing. Over this decade, we have an incredible opportunity to make an ambitious global commitment to restore nature through the New Deal for Nature and People. We believe that people and nature can thrive together – we all have a part to play. Only a global coalition of the willing can make all this happen. In order to address those challenges, African Network of Young Leaders for Peace and Sustainable Development set in 2020 the New deal for Nature and people Coalition of civil society organizations. Under the leadership of African network of Young Leaders for Peace and Sustainable Development, African youths and civil society organizations have drafted and started the implementation of two regional position papers on COVID19 and pandemics and towards a strong post 2020 Global Biodiversity Framework for a green growth resumption in Africa and in the world. The ND4NPC Best practices booklet aims to valorise best practices of civil society organisations in this frame. The ND4NPC booklet will be issued every trimester of the year.

 

READ THE FULL BOOKLET HERE

AFRICAN’S PEACE AND SECURITY

Gone are simply the days when African ‘Huge Men’ propagated themselves in patterns of proceeded with initiative and force. The contemporary African populace is turning out to be all the more politically illuminated and their political direction has moved from the since quite a while ago settled political culture to more develop vote-based advancement. The breezes of progress are seething across the district thus summoned ‘third termers’ are blurring. Today, something like 75% or a greater number of official organizations are intertwined with term limits, as indicated by the 2015 Afro barometer report. While service time restrictions been rejected in something like nine African nations like Niger, Chad, Rwanda, Cameroon, Togo, Uganda, Guinea, Djibouti and Gabon, some defiant political pioneers have endeavoured to clutch power through the instrumentality of protected control or genuine noncompliance to set up service time restraints. Some of these systems have thought that it was not difficult to do as such, by directing sacred control through parliamentarians. When their gathering holds the larger part in parliament, it turns out to be not difficult to accomplish residency lengthening. This political rationale has been seen in a large group of African nations, including Nigeria under President Olusegun Obasanjo looking for his third term after the finish of two terms. The stretching was later barricaded by the upper authoritative chamber – National Assembly.

 

READ MORE HERE

BUILDING PEACE AND SOLIDARITY

Advancing peace and solidarity within a nation or amongst nations is complicated and it can only be achieved with the help of collective action. The primary objective of any nation is to inculcate within its people a sense of unity and trust and to develop it both, nationally and internationally. 

Africa, just like every other continent has been facing numerous challenges as far as establishing peace and development are concerned, even after the launch of a good deal of peace initiatives. A large number of resources have been utilized to carve out peace agreements, which ultimately collapsed due to varied reasons. Peace and solidarity are the key elements of any normal nation.[1] It is the responsibility of both, the states and the people to maintain peace and solidarity amongst one another and any kind of violation of human rights is not appreciated at any level. It is very important to create and maintain balance between the traditional values and progressive values within and amongst the nations.

Mrs. Vidushi Verma

Read More here

[1]https://www.accord.org.za/ajcr-issues/african-approaches-to-building-peace-and-social-solidarity/